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Abstract
Political parties differ in the geographic distribution of their support. This paper
argues that a territorially uneven distribution of a party’s votes facilitates its participation
in government, because it produces a tendency to prioritize demands for locally-targeted
goods that are more conducive to the negotiation of reciprocal logrolling agreements with
potential partners. Using a measure based on the Gini coefficient, I empirically evaluate
the extent to which the geographic concentration of votes plays a role in the formation of
governments, taking Spanish local elections from 1987 to 2011 as a testbed. With around
500 formation opportunities and 20,000 potential governments, multinomial choice models
are estimated (conditional and mixed logits) and a very sizable effect is documented: a
one-standard-deviation increase in the electoral geographic concentration of a potential
government almost doubles the likelihood of its formation. These findings are relevant for
students of government formation, regional parties, and political geography.
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1 Introduction
The geographical distribution of votes across the territory conditions many facets of the politi-
cal process, including the configuration of party systems, parties’ electoral success, and resource
allocation in the making of policies. And yet, we know little about whether and how politi-
cal geography shapes one of the cornerstones of representative democracies: the formation of
governments.
A perennial question in the study of government formation processes is ‘who gets in’, which
is particularly relevant in multiparty PR systems, where situations in which no single party
controls the majority of parliamentary seats are most common. In these contexts, elections
determine parliaments but do not decide on the composition of the government, which has to
be settled in negotiations between parties, commencing once all votes have been tallied. In such
bargaining processes many elements come into play, not only election results. In fact, previous
studies have found a surprisingly poor correlation between the fate of politicians and parties in
office and the evolution of their electoral fortunes (Cheibub and Przeworski, 1999; Mattila and
Raunio, 2004; Maravall, 2007, 2010). Other additional factors, therefore, must hold the key to
explaining participation in government.
From the many studies that have examined the determinants of a party’s chances of joining
government, size and ideology emerge as the most influential factors. In a nutshell, parties
that are larger, and more closely identified with the median in the predominant ideological
dimension, are more likely to succeed (e.g. Warwick, 1996; Martin and Stevenson, 2001; Mattila
and Raunio, 2004; Isaksson, 2005; Indridason, 2011; Savage, 2014). Other factors, such as
greater internal democracy (Bäck, 2008), links to past authoritarian regimes (Druckman and
Roberts, 2007), or withdrawals from previous coalitions (Tavits, 2008), have been found to have
a negative effect, hindering a party’s prospects of gaining access to government. The effect of
incumbency, meanwhile, appears to be contingent on other institutional and party-level factors
(Martin and Stevenson, 2010). In general, it seems that while incumbent governments are
better positioned to (re-)form, incumbent parties, on the other hand, tend to be disadvantaged
(Glasgow and Golder, 2015).
All these notwithstanding, parties also differ in the extent to which their votes are either
geographically concentrated or, rather, homogeneously distributed across the territory. Previ-
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ous research has shown that regional parties, with territorially concentrated electorates, tend to
focus primarily on securing benefits particular to their region in order to satisfy their clienteles
(Kitschelt, 2000; Heller, 2002; Kellam, 2015). While evidence has accrued to demonstrate the
success of such policies (e.g. De Winter and Tursan, 1998), we know much less about whether
and why these parties become partners in governments.
This paper considers the role of political geography in government formation processes.
I argue that the territorial distribution of a party’s votes will shape its attractiveness as a
potential coalition partner. Regionalized parties (i.e. those with an uneven distribution of
votes across the territory), the argument goes, will have geographically targeted interests that
can be more easily accommodated in the bargaining process leading to the formation of a
government than parties that make broader, more programmatic, demands.
The paper contributes to existing scholarly research on three different streams of analysis.
Firstly, it enhances previous literature by focusing on the role of the geographic distribution of
parties’ support: a variable that has been found to greatly influence the dynamics of political
competition and policy-making, but has been overlooked in the study of government formation.
Secondly, the paper also communicates to scientific research interested in the role that regional
parties play in democracies by focusing on their capacity to take part in government coalitions.
Finally, this work also contributes to the stream of literature that has studied the political
effects of electoral geography by highlighting, in particular, the consequences it may have for
the formation of governments in parliamentary democracies.
2 The Argument
The geographical distribution of political preferences has profound consequences on various
aspects of political competition. The number of parties that compete, the platforms that they
choose, the likelihood of electoral success, and even the choice of electoral institutions, can all
be greatly conditioned depending on whether there is a symmetric or asymmetric distribution
of preferences across a territory (Rodden, 2010).
A recently developed body of research examines the effect of the geographic concentration
of voter preferences on the level and composition of public spending (e.g. McGillivray, 2004;
Rickard, 2012; Jurado, 2014; Jusko, 2015; Jurado and León, 2016). In general, these studies find
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that the territorial distribution of voters interacts with electoral rules in shaping policy-making:
resource allocation in majoritarian systems appears to be more sensitive to variations in the
geographic clustering of the electorate than in PR systems. Nonetheless, political geography
also seems to matter in the latter, where increasing geographic concentration curbs spending
on universalistic policies to the benefit of particularistic projects.
Whether voters with similar political preferences are clustered in certain areas, or homoge-
neously spread across a territory, has consequences, not only for the political system as a whole,
but also for individual political parties. Within the same party system, parties can differ in the
geographic distribution of their support. Some have geographically concentrated electorates
whereas the supporters of other parties are widely dispersed. I claim that the former will re-
spond to narrower interests than the latter and, therefore, will have different relative preferences
as between particularistic and universalistic (programmatic) policies. Since the geographical
targetability of certain goods is higher than others, the electoral geography of a party will have
an impact on the demands it makes in the context of negotiating a coalition agreement.
My argument builds upon two clusters of claims and findings from previous studies. Firstly,
politicians with strongly regionalized bases of support are said to have higher incentives to
provide particularistic (pork-barrel) spending projects to the regions in which they are elec-
torally strong (aka, bringing home the bacon). When the voters of a party are geographically
dispersed, on the other hand, the electoral returns for spending on these kinds of projects are
low compared to spending on other (non-geographically-targeted) goods. This argument can
be found, for instance, in Jurado (2014), who argues that as the electoral support of a party
becomes more concentrated in specific areas of a territory, so the party is compelled to resort to
particularistic, locally-honed policies with which they can more efficiently target their voters.
On the contrary, for parties that obtain a similar level of electoral support across the terri-
tory, the incentives will be to pursue policies that spread benefits to voters, without geographic
discrimination.
Secondly, and consequently, where parties differ in their preferences for certain types of
goods depending on the geographic distribution of their support, they are also likely to diverge
in the types of demands they make when bargaining over the formation of a new government.
I contend that the presence of parties with stronger preferences for narrow, geographically-
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defined, policies eases coalition negotiations. This argument has previously been made in
studies of coalition-building processes in the US Congress. Geographically-targeted projects
are traded on a logrolling basis to satisfy coalition members’ geographically-defined interests
(Mayhew, 1974), but they also grease the wheels more generally, helping to construct coalitions
between political actors with and without geographically narrow preferences that secure leg-
islative packages that also include “general benefit legislation” (e.g. Evans, 1994, 2004; Ellwood
and Patashnik, 1993; Ferejohn, 1974).1
While most of these arguments speak to the formation of coalitions between individual
legislators, an analogous case can be made for negotiations between parties in multi-party leg-
islatures. Recently, Kellam (2015) has applied this idea to coalition politics in Latin American
presidential systems. She argues that parties oriented towards particularistic goods “hire out”
their support to the President in exchange for locally-targeted policies. That, according to
Kellam, reduces the price of these parties as potential coalition partners and provides presi-
dents with coalitional flexibility. In a similar vein, others have made this general argument
in relation to parliamentary systems. Heller (2002), for instance, focuses on policy exchanges
between parties in Spain, claiming that, because their primary focus is on their own regions
rather than the whole country, parties with a regionalized support seek a different set of re-
wards than national parties, and that “opens the door to policy-making bargains that would
be unavailable to national parties alone.” (Heller, 2002, 660-661).
However, we can also apply this argument specifically to the government formation processes
that occur in parliamentary systems. Parties with particularistic preferences should become
attractive bedfellows from the point of view of a potential coalition partner, because they
can be satisfied with some locally-targeted spending, leaving the rest of resources available to
pursue any other kind of program without having to share the credit. Geographically narrow
interests, therefore, increase the compatibility of parties’ demands in terms of electoral credit-
claiming, thereby making access to government more likely for those parties with territorially
concentrated electorates.This argument complements the idea that ‘preference tangentiality’
between parties, namely, parties whose salient interests do not overlap with each other, increases
their compatibility and makes reaching compromises easier because their demands fit better
1There is also experimental evidence indicating that the availability of private goods to distribute among
legislators helps to reach legislative compromise (see for instance Christiansen et al., 2014).
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together (Luebbert, 1986; Falcó-Gimeno, 2014). In this case, the geographical concentration
of parties’ support would make their territorial interests more tangential, their demands more
compatible, and therefore, should facilitate coalition-building. This compatibility can take two
different forms. On the one hand, the locally-targeted demands of a territorially-concentrated
party are likely to be compatible with the preferences of another (programmatic) party that
has a more homogeneously distributed basis of support, who seeks to advance its own general-
interest policy agenda. On the other hand, the geographically narrow interests of a party might
also be compatible with those of another party whose interests are concentrated in a different
part of the territory. It is beyond the scope of this paper to generate a clear-cut prediction on
which of these two types of compatibility is more likely to crystallize into a new government,
or in which circumstances one or the other formation is more probable.2 The main theoretical
expectation of this paper is that, on average, increasing geographic concentration will make
government participation more likely, ceteris paribus.
3 Measurement
I have argued that the electoral geography of the party is tightly connected to the intensity of
preference for particularistic goods and that, in turn, should map to the government formation
process. Therefore, to estimate the effect of the territorial distribution of a party’s votes on
its chances of participating in government, a measure of the geographic asymmetry of parties’
electoral support is first needed. This is what I will call an index of geographic concentration.
To accomplish that I have relied on a measure used in the literature on the nationalization of
party systems, which is based on the Gini coefficient of the inequality of parties’ vote shares
across different territorial units. The standard Gini coefficient, however, does not correct the
potential bias coming from the unequal size of the territorial units within a given polity or
the unequal number of units across polities, in measuring the regional heterogeneity of parties’
votes (Bochsler, 2010). This is why I use Bochsler’s ‘standardized Party Nationalization Score’
(sPNS), that takes both factors into account, to measure the extent to which the electoral
strength of a party is evenly distributed across the territory, ranging from 0 (maximum region-
2The specific types of policies that fall under the competence of the government, which may be different in
different contexts, or the financial tensions that the government has to face, are likely to make a difference in
this regard.
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alization) to 1 (maximum nationalization). I then simply invert the sPNS score (subtract it
from 1) in order to produce a Geographical Concentration Index (GCI). The formula is the
following:3


























where vji refers to the number of voters of party j in the territorial unit i in a polity with a
total of U units, ordered according to the increasing vote share of party j.4
Table 1 shows the scores of the GCI in three stylized scenarios in which a total of 300 votes
are cast in three different territorial units (100 votes in each). In all three hypothetical cases,
parties A, B, C, and D have obtained a total of 120, 90, 45, and 45 votes, respectively. In
scenario (a) all four parties have a fairly even distribution of the voters across tracts, whereas
in scenario (b) parties have specific territorial strongholds as well as places where their support
is scarce. Scenario (c), on the other hand, depicts an intermediate situation where one party
(D), is clearly more geographically polarized than the rest. The GCI, as shown, captures these
party differences.








A 40 39 41 .0231
B 30 31 29 .0308
C 15 16 14 .0611









A 40 10 70 .5725
B 30 55 5 .6208
C 25 0 20 .6208









A 45 30 45 .1667
B 35 25 30 .1490
C 15 10 20 .2854
D 5 35 5 .7083
(c) Mixed scenario
Note: Entries are numbers of votes.
3See Bochsler (2010, 164), who uses a slightly different notation.
4As shown later, the empirical results are robust to the use of other indices to measure the regionalization
of parties’ vote shares.
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4 Research Design
4.1 The local level as a testbed
The empirical analyses of this paper are run on a sample of Spanish local governments; specif-
ically from the region of Catalonia. In contrast to most of the studies cited above that refer
to nationwide coalition-building processes, then, this paper will focus on the municipal level
and consider each municipality as an independent polity. The paper studies the formation of
governments in a large number of Spanish municipalities and measures the level of geographical
concentration of each party within each municipality. That is, I will test the extent to which
parties that are strongly regionalized in specific parts of a municipality are more likely to par-
ticipate in its local government (rather than analyze how regional parties, at the national level,
perform in government formation processes at the local level).
The empirical assessment of general theories of coalition formation and stability using data
on local governments in one single country is quite standard (e.g. Bäck (2003, 2008) in Sweden,
Blockmans et al. (2016) in Belgium, Daniele et al. (2017) in Italy, Debus and Gross (2016) in
Germany, Laver et al. (1987) in the UK, Fujiwara and Sanz (2017) in Spain, Serritzlew et al.
(2010) and Skjaeveland et al. (2007) in Denmark, or Steunenberg (1992) in the Netherlands).
The case made for using local data in these studies is, in general, that “the analysis of local
coalitions within a single country holds constant the two key variables of time and polity.
This allows for the testing of theories adapted to the specific situations of particular coalition
systems while still retaining sufficient cases to conduct a useful analysis.” (Laver et al., 1987,
503). In the case of this paper, the requirements that should be met for the theory to travel
well to the local level would be that 1) local governments have a variety of policies at hand
that can be broadly characterized as more or less geographically-targeted/universalistic and
thus, given budget constraints, that a trade-off exists between them to cater to geographically
concentrated or dispersed constituencies; 2) political competition in local elections is to a certain
extent structured around which of these policies parties defend for the municipality; and 3) the
local government is clearly identifiable and its formation typically requires a bargaining process
between political parties. In the following I defend why the Spanish local level is a particularly
suitable testing ground that meets these criteria.
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Firstly, Spanish municipal executives are legally obliged to provide a wide range of public
services, which increase with the municipality’s size: “all municipalities are responsible, as a
minimum, for the provision of public lighting, a cemetery, waste collection, street care and
cleaning, water, sewerage services, and food safety. In addition, municipalities with a popula-
tion greater than 5,000 residents are also responsible for the provision of public parks, a public
library, a market, and waste treatment. Beyond that, municipalities with a population greater
than 20,000 residents are also responsible for the provision of civil defence, social services, fire
services, and sport facilities. Municipalities with a population greater than 50,000 residents
are also responsible for the provision of public transport and environmental protection.” (Vil-
lata Puig, 2013, 289). Also, municipalities can provide further services in areas like education,
culture, gender equality, housing, health, and environmental protection, in coordination with
the regional and central governments, and, although they are not able to establish new taxes,
they are responsible for administering and can increase/decrease a number of taxes affecting
business, real estate, vehicle property, construction, among others. The competences of Spanish
local governments are therefore multi-purpose, with the major budgetary items corresponding
to policy responsibilities traditionally assigned to the local public sector: environmental ser-
vices, urban planning, transport, welfare and social services, etc. (Solé-Ollé, 2006). That
includes, therefore, pork-barrel geographically-targeted spending (e.g. lighting and paving) as
well as general-interest policies (e.g. refuse collection and treatment, home healthcare services,
or certain taxes). To the extent that the variation in the policies available for local governments
can be thought of as continuum from geographically-targeted to more universalistic policies,
the context is appropriate to test the general argument presented here. Of course, some uni-
versalistic policies at the local level have geographically narrow implications and, to the same
extent, policies targeted at specific areas within the municipality also have spillovers for the rest
of its territory. Nonetheless, the geographical consequences of paving a particular street in a
particular neighborhood as opposed to increasing certain business taxes seem clearly different.
Secondly, this wide array of competences implies that government formation processes at the
Spanish municipal level are politically relevant and their outcomes are certainly consequential
for citizens’ lives. As a result, local issues play an important part in the electoral competition
happening in Spanish municipal elections, where the contextual factors and shortcuts that
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shape voting behavior are singular to the local arena and different from those that tend to
operate in general or regional elections (Barberá, 2010; Riera et al., 2016, 2017; Skrinis and
Teperoglou, 2008).
Thirdly, the process that leads to the formation of a government in Spanish municipalities
mirrors that of many parliamentary democracies: a vote of investiture is held to elect the mayor,
who has to obtain the absolute majority of positive votes from the municipal plenary (i.e. the
parliament).5 The mayor, then, allocates policy responsibilities to those councillors that will
form the municipal government, much like ministers in national governments.
As said, focusing on local governments in one particular country keeps many economic,
social, cultural, and institutional differences constant as compared to cross-national studies,
while at the same time gives scope for a large number of observations. As usual, this internal
validity advantage comes, of course, at the expense of external validity. However, given that
Spanish local governments very much resemble executives at other administrative levels in terms
of the type and importance of their policy remits, there are reasons to believe that the lessons
we can derive from this study apply far beyond Spain and are not simply idiosyncratic to its
local institutions.
4.2 Data
In terms of data, I rely on two different sources. Firstly, I leverage the census tract-level data
that the Spanish Ministry of Interior makes publicly available in its website.6 In this database
one can find the exact vote counts of all running parties in each census tract for all elections
since 1987. I specifically use data from the seven local elections held in Spain from 1987 to
2011 to elect representatives at municipal council level.
Secondly, I also use Mart́ınez Farrero’s (2015) data on the formation of local governments
in 131 municipalities of one particular region of Spain: Catalonia, from 1983 to 2011.From the
947 municipalities existing in the region, Mart́ınez Farrero selected the 131 with more than
10,000 inhabitants in 2011. Thus, they were not selected on the basis of the type of government
formed, i.e., the dependent variable. The government formation processes of these selected
5If the vote is lost, the head of the party with the highest number of votes is automatically elected mayor.
Nonetheless, the formation of coalitions typically involve that the mayor is elected in the first vote of investiture.
6http://www.infoelectoral.interior.es. Corrections of some typographical errors in the recording of
actual votes have been made by the author.
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municipalities were then traced back to 1987 (regardless of the evolution of the number of
inhabitants). It bears mentioning that the identification of the parties that are members of the
government is based on whether or not they hold portfolios with specific policy remits attached
to them (i.e. councillorships with policy responsibilities) and that only postelection governments
are coded. Subsequent government changes during the term are, hence, not considered in this
database.
Table 2 offers some descriptive information on these governments. 38% of them were formed
in situations in which a single party obtained the absolute majority of seats in the local parlia-
ment. That leaves around 500 governments formed in situations of parliamentary minority, and
it is these I will look at in the empirical analyses; where actual negotiations between parties
over the formation of a new government take place.7 In these contexts, coalition governments
formed in more than 3/4 of the formation opportunities and 30% did not secure a majority of
seats. More than half of the sample governments were minimum winning coalitions, and only
17% were oversized. The average government in a minority situation included more than 2
parties and a total seat share of around 55%. Finally, the largest party in parliament was a
member of the cabinet in the overwhelming majority of cases (87%), and at least one of the
parties in office had participated in the preceding government on more than 2/3 of the occasions.
Nonetheless, less than 20% of the governments formed held power over two consecutive terms
with the same partisan composition.8
In the particular context of these data, the geographical concentration index averages 0.075
across the 3,900 party-municipality-election observations for which we have information, and
it displays a rather right-skewed distribution (skewness = 4.6), much like most measures of
regionalization at the party level.9 The descriptive statistics are offered in Table 3. Reassuringly,
the GCI strongly correlates with more traditional indexes of distributional inequality, such as
the Gini index –used in reversed form in Jones and Mainwaring (2003) as a score of party
nationalization– (r = .791 ; p < .001).
7The results that will be presented below, though, do not hinge on this decision. Including majority
situations in the analyses –under which (surplus) coalition governments do also form 1/4 of the times– yields
essentially the same conclusions.
8It should be noted that incumbency here refers to the previous postelection government, which might in
some cases be different than the actual outgoing government.
9Note that if we take the square root of the GCI to increase the normality of the distribution, significantly
reducing right-skewness (down to a value of 2.0), and use it for the analyses, there is no consequential change
in the results presented below.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Governments
All situations Minority situations
Mean SD p50 N Mean SD p50 N
Absolute Majority 0.38 0.48 0 860 – – – –
Coalition 0.58 0.49 1 860 0.78 0.42 1 536
Minority Government 0.18 0.39 0 860 0.30 0.46 0 536
Minimum Winning Coalition 0.33 0.49 1 860 0.54 0.50 1 536
Surplus Coalition 0.20 0.40 0 860 0.17 0.37 0 536
N. of Parties 1.87 0.92 2 860 2.21 0.90 2 536
Total Seat Share 58.0 12.1 54.5 860 55.1 12.1 52.9 536
Largest Party In 0.92 0.27 1 860 0.87 0.33 1 536
Any Incumbent Party In 0.77 0.42 1 748 0.70 0.46 1 490
Incumbent Government 0.32 0.47 0 748 0.19 0.39 0 490
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of GCI
Mean SD p10 p50 p90 Min Max N
GCI .075 .064 .030 .060 .127 .001 .779 3900
Finally, to get a clearer sense of how the geographical concentration measure works, Figure 1
maps the actual territorial distribution of the vote of two parties in the municipality of Torroella
de Montgŕı in the 2011 local elections. In this municipality of about 11,000 inhabitants, 17
representatives were elected. None of the parties obtained a sufficient majority to form a
government on its own. The winning party won 5 seats (CiU); the second largest obtained
4 (ERC); L’Estartit Som Tots (LEST) and Unitat i Progrés Municipal – Progrés Municipal
(PSC) won 3 apiece, whereas two other parties obtained 1 each (COET and PP). As this
figure shows, LEST and PSC obtained similar vote shares and the same number of seats in
the local parliament, but they differed markedly in the territorial distribution of their votes.
Whereas PSC obtained vote shares of between 15 and 22 percent in all census tracts (except
just one, where it got 7% of the votes), LEST received the lion’s share of its electoral force in
one particular stronghold: more than 60% of the votes cast in the census tract where l’Estartit
belongs (a village within the territory of Torroella de Montgŕı), were for LEST. In the rest of
the census tracts, though, the party obtained an average of only 4% of the votes. As a result,
on the index of geographical concentration, LEST scores about four times higher than PSC
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Figure 1. Examples of Parties with High and Low Geographical Concentration in the Same








[Vote Share=18.3% ; Seat Share=17.6%]








[Vote Share=15.4% ; Seat Share=17.6%]
UPM-PM (PSC)
Note: The Geographical Concentration Index (Reverse Standardized Party Nationalization
Score) in this case scores 0.428 for LEST and 0.114 for PSC. This means that the geographical
concentration of LEST’s votes is around four times higher than that of PSC’s support.
(0.428 and 0.114, respectively). Interestingly, the postelection bargaining process in this case
ended up with CiU, the largest party, proposing a minimum winning coalition to LEST and
PP, which reached the necessary majority of 9 seats (5+3+1). LEST and not PSC, therefore,
made its way into office and gave its support to the investiture of CiU’s candidate for mayor.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Baseline models
As is standard practice in statistical analyses of government formation, I employ multinomial
choice models where the units of analysis are defined as formation opportunities, and potential
governments as choice alternatives (Martin and Stevenson, 2001; Bäck, 2003; Diermeier and
Merlo, 2004; Druckman et al., 2005; Warwick, 2005; Golder, 2006; Skjaeveland et al., 2007;
Bäck and Dumont, 2008; Indridason, 2008; Kang, 2009; Martin and Stevenson, 2010). It has
been claimed that these types of models are most appropriate to study the determinants of
parties’ likelihood to join governments, rather than binary choice models, in order to control
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for coalition-level effects: “analysts should use the government formation opportunity as the
unit of analysis even if the question of interest centers on parties.” (Glasgow and Golder,
2015). Therefore, the analyses presented below use conditional logits as well as mixed logits
(see Glasgow et al., 2012).10 The variation that is going to be exploited is, therefore, within
formation opportunity, implying that there is no reason to be concerned about potential sources
of heterogeneity across municipalities or time that might correlate with parties’ geographical
concentration, raising a threat to causal identification.
Given that the observations are not parties but potential governments, the party-level vari-
ables in the model specifications can represent either the presence or the amount of that variable
in the potential government. Party size, for instance, is accounted for in the model through
a dummy indicating whether or not the potential government includes the largest party in
parliament, the total Seat Share of the government, and its second power (Seat Share2/100 )
to account for non-linear effects (divided by 100 to make the scale of the estimated coefficient
more similar to the rest). Incumbent Party and Incumbent Mayor, on the other hand, take
value 1 if the potential government contains at least one party that was in the previous one,
and the previous mayor’s party, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
With respect to key explanatory factor (a continuous variable at the party-level), its repre-
sentation at the potential government level takes into account how the additional geographical
concentration a party brings to the government changes the coalition as a whole (Glasgow and
Golder, 2015). In contrast to additional seats (which may have a non-linear impact on the
chances of formation of the coalition), there is nothing in the argument above that makes us
expect anything different than a monotonically (linear) positive effect of geographical concen-
tration. Hence, the variable is represented at the government level adding up the GCIs of the
parties forming the coalition. Additionally, I show further on that the results are robust when
alternative aggregation techniques are applied, such as the arithmetic and weighted averages
of the coalition members’ GCIs. Besides, it is true that there is a relevant, substantive dif-
ference between a potential government in which two parties have their respective territorial
strongholds, on the one hand, and the scenario in which one party has an even distribution of
the vote while the other is geographically concentrated, on the other. In the former, both par-
10For reassurance, I run a series of robustness tests with binary logits where parties are the observations. The
coefficient estimates of the geographical concentration index are positive and statistically significant (p < .05).
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ties would have narrow geographic interests in two different parts of the territory. In the latter,
according to our argument, the two parties would have different types of preferences in terms
of locally-targeted goods vs. general-interest policies. The form of compatibility between the
demands of the two parties would be different in each scenario, but we do not have any specific
expectation as to which of the two governments would be more likely to form. Therefore, since
it is, in any case, clear that we expect increasing geographic concentration to make a single
party more likely to participate in government –assuming the nature of the potential partners
remains constant– we stick with the above-mentioned aggregation strategy. In addition, the
Appendix shows that variance in the GCIs of the parties in the potential government does not
significantly affect the likelihood of formation.11
Table 4 presents the estimations yielded by the statistical analyses, following Glasgow and
Golder’s (2015) model specifications.12 The exponentiated coefficients reported in Table 4 and
the coefficient estimates plotted in Figure 2 show that our results for the formation of local
governments in Catalonia accord with the main findings of previous studies. Larger parties are
more likely to join a government, although the effect of size is marginally decreasing. The effect
of incumbency, on the other hand, has two clearly differentiated sides. Incumbent governments
are around five times more likely to form anew than any other government but, controlling
for the latter, having been a member of the previous government negatively impacts on the
likelihood of joining the next government. The same goes for the incumbent mayor’s party.
Also, minimum winning coalitions and governments with fewer parties are more likely to form
than minority governments and governments with a larger number of parties.
The fact that these results closely match findings from previous studies is indeed reassuring.
However, this paper is mainly concerned with the effect of the territorial distribution of the vote
on government formation processes. The models presented in columns 3 and 4 yield positive and
strongly statistically significant coefficient estimates of Geo. Concentration (GCI). Specifically,
a one-standard-deviation increase in the government’s GCI yields a 97% boost in the chances
11More specifically, a variable measuring the standard deviation of parties’ GCIs in the potential government
is introduced in the baseline model both additively and in interaction with overall GCI. None of the effects is
significantly different from zero as Table A.1 in the appendix shows.
12In column 4 I relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption and employ a mixed logit
with random coefficients (Glasgow et al., 2012). The McFadden and Train’s (2000) Lagrange multiplier test
determines that estimating a model with random coefficients for a few variables would fit the data better, but
the final analysis yields very similar results both for geographical polarization and the control variables. If
anything, it estimates a larger impact of the former.
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Table 4. Coalition Formation & Geographical Concentration




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incumbent Party 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Largest Party 6.43∗∗∗ 2.77∗∗∗ 2.74∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗
(1.09) (0.54) (0.53) (0.59)
Incumbent Mayor 0.91 0.51∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.93
(0.16) (0.094) (0.096) (0.10) (0.53)
Seat Share 1.32∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗ 1.00
(0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.14) (0.022)
Seat Share2/100 0.77∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.052) (0.021)
Incumbent Government 5.36∗∗∗ 5.31∗∗∗ 6.54∗∗∗
(0.80) (0.79) (1.51)
Minority Government 0.44∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 7.92
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (11.9)
Minimum Winning Coalition 1.56∗∗ 1.53∗∗ 1.34
(0.29) (0.29) (0.34)
N. of Parties 0.39∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 2.81∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.039) (0.038) (0.75)
Geo. Concentration (GCI) 47.6∗∗∗ 53.6∗∗∗
(39.5) (52.6)
N 19406 19406 19391 19391
Log Likelihood -1346.1 -1203.5 -1190.0 -1167.4
No. Form. Opp. 490 490 489 489
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Note: Coefficient estimates from model (3) in Table 4. 95% confidence intervals.
of a government to form, which is substantially larger than the (standardized) effect of other
traditional variables, such as being the incumbent government (+30%), having a minority status
(-35%), or being a minimum winning coalition (+15%).
In order to interpret the substantive effect of geographical concentration at the level of in-
dividual parties instead of governments, I follow Däubler and Debus (2009) and Glasgow and
Golder (2015) who generate a counterfactual comparison in one specific situation. In partic-
ular, I take the example of Torroella de Montgŕı 2011 presented above, and compare parties’
likelihood to join government under the real (baseline) situation and under a hypothetical case
in which LEST (the party whose votes were extremely concentrated in the Eastern part of the
municipality) was as homogeneously distributed across the territory as PSC (the similarly-sized
party with a much more balanced distribution of voters). To do that, I calculate the probability
that each party in that formation opportunity would join the government under the real-world
values (baseline scenario) and under a counterfactual scenario in which the GCI of LEST scored
0.114 instead of the real 0.428.13
13For the specific calculation of the party-level probabilities, see Glasgow and Golder (2015, 751).
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CiU ERC LEST PSC COET PP
Baseline Prob.
Counterfactual Prob.
Note: Baseline scenario refers to the probabilities estimated taking the real-world values of
the 2011 election in Torroella de Montgŕı. Counterfactual scenario refers to a hypothetical
situation in which LEST had the same GCI as PSC: 0.114 instead of 0.428. Simulations based
on model (4) in Table 4. 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3 shows that, while the odds of participating in government increase only slightly for
the rest of the parties, the change is dramatic for LEST. The probability of joining government
for this party is about 70% in the baseline scenario but plunges to around 43% in the case
where their votes were more evenly spread across the municipality. Not surprisingly, the latter
is precisely the participation probability for PSC, the party that was very similar to LEST
except for the territorial distribution of its votes.
The Location of Concentration
Another matter of interest may be the specific location of parties’ electoral strongholds and
how that may impact on the government formation process. At the same level of geographical
concentration, voters from certain parties may group around the hub of the municipality while
other parties may have their strongholds in the periphery. Importantly, voters in the center
might benefit from spending oriented to universalistic policies that are nevertheless (inadver-
tently or not) geographically-tailored in practice. Various social services, for instance, may be
provided in (the vicinity of) the town hall premises, decreasing the cost of consumption for
citizens living nearby. Similarly, as a by-product of the location of town halls, certain uni-
versalistic services may go hand-in-hand with pork-barrel spending to assist in their provision
(refurbishment of streets to facilitate access to official buildings, etc.). Voters in the periphery,
by contrast, are less likely to benefit from, or will face higher costs to access, these kinds of
policy initiatives and may therefore demand pure pork in return.
The extent to which the specific locus of their support may or may not facilitate transactions
between parties in the context of government formation bargaining is a matter for debate. On
the one hand, parties defending the interests of voters in the peripheries might make the sort
of demands of pork-barrel spending that are easier to accommodate through logrolling. But
on the other hand, parties with strongholds around the municipality’s center, may find a wider
range of policies attractive from the point of view of their territorially-concentrated voters, and
hence be more flexible in their demands. At any rate, this falls to be adjudicated empirically,
which will help identify the scope conditions of the argument presented in the paper.
To do this, I calculated the Euclidean distance from the centroid of each census tract to
the specific location of the headquarters of the municipality (typically, the town hall). I then
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divided that distance by the average tract-capital distance in that municipality to provide a
relative measure (ratio) of peripherality of each census tract within a municipality. Next, I
calculated a ratio of the vote share of each party in each census tract to the aggregate vote
share of that party in the municipality. Then, I multiplied both ratios and averaged those
products across all census tracts to end up with a single, party-dependent score of Peripherality
within each municipality. Low (high) values indicate that the vote shares of the party are











where di refers to the euclidean distance from the centroid of the territorial unit i to the center
of a polity with a total of U units, d̄ is the average distance between territorial units and the
center in the polity, sji refers to the seat share of party j in unit i, and sj to the aggregate vote
share of party j in the polity.
Table 5. Coalition Formation & Geographical Concentration
Impact of Peripherality (2003-2011)
clogit clogit
(1) (2)




GCI * Peripherality 2.71∗∗
(1.12)
Party-level Controls YES YES
Government-level Controls YES YES
N 14145 14145
Log Likelihood -737.8 -735.3
No. Form. Opp. 295 295
Note: Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.
Party-level controls include Incumbent Party, Largest Party,
Incumbent Mayor Seat Share, and Seat Share2/100.
Government-level controls include Incumbent Government, Minority
Government, Minimum Winning Coalition, and N. of Parties. For
the complete list of coefficient estimates and standard errors see
Table B.1 in the appendix.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Note: 95% confidence intervals.
Table 5 presents the results of the interaction between the geographical concentration and
peripherality measures. The reduction of the sample to the period 2003-2011 is due to the fact
that the geographical coordinates of both census tracts and town halls in Catalonia is only
available from 2002.14 Controlling for geographical concentration, interestingly, peripherality
does not seem to impact on the chances of government participation (model 1). However, the
influence of this variable seems to emerge conditionally. Peripherality moderates the effect of
concentration on the likelihood of joining a government. More specifically, the more peripheral
the location of the electoral supports of the party, the larger the impact of concentration. Or
the other way around: the greater the concentration in the center, the weaker the relationship
between concentration and government participation.
This can also be seen in Figure 4, which shows that the marginal effect of GCI, although
always positive, only becomes significant once a minimum level of peripherality is reached
(around 3 in a scale from 0 to 9). That means that the effect of geographical concentration is not
distinguishable from zero when that concentration occurs around the center of the municipality.
However, the effect is shown to be positive and significant for more than half of the sample.
14Data from the Institut Cartogràfic i Geològic de Catalunya: http://www.icgc.cat/en/
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This evidence sheds light on the sources of demand-satisfaction in negotiation processes for
the formation of a government. The demands made by parties defending the interests of the
periphery seem to be accommodated with greater alacrity than those from parties representing
the interests of the center. For the latter, it appears, it is not so clear whether, or how, the
‘bringing-home-the-bacon’ motif works.
5.2 Robustness tests
The evidence presented so far seems to suggest that there is a strong positive relationship
between the territorial concentration of a party’s votes and its chances of joining government.
However, one might think of alternative explanations for this finding. Potential confounders
may include alternative sources of bargaining leverage. Parties with clearly defined strongholds
may well tend to be independent organizations specific to each municipality, created to defend
the interests of particular neighborhoods. These parties are typically autonomous and therefore,
unconstrained by the directives imposed by regional or national party caucuses, which, for
various reasons, may affect parties’ ability to reach coalition compromises and join government.
Models 2-6 in Table 6 control for this possibility: Independent Party is a dummy variable
that indicates whether or not the party has an explicit link to a supra-municipal partisan
organization that runs in the regional and/or national elections.
On the other hand, we know that a key determinant that has been unambiguously found
to affect government formation is the ideological positioning of parties. In the above analyses,
however, ideology has not been accounted for. The reason is simple: for many parties in the
local arena, their specific goals and demands cannot be classified according to a left-right scale.
However, insofar as ideological positioning and the territorial distribution of votes covary, we
face an identification problem. Parties with specific territorial strongholds within a municipality,
for instance, may have moderate ideological positions in the traditional dimensions of political
competition and that would facilitate their participation in government. Models 3-6 in Table 6
attempt to account for the influence of ideology in the two main dimensions of the Catalan
political space: left-right, and Spanish-Catalan nationalism. Inescapably, though, this effort
requires the rather bold assumptions that i) all local parties with an explicit link to a specific
region- or nation-wide party share the exact same position in both scales and, most heroically,
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ii) that all independent parties are placed in the middle of both dimensions (a 5 in a 0 to 10
scale).15
Table 6. Coalition Formation & Geographical Concentration
Robustness to Ideological Distance and Type of Party
clogit clogit clogit clogit clogit clogit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Geo. Concentration (GCI) 47.6∗∗∗ 50.7∗∗∗ 44.5∗∗∗ 27.0∗∗∗ 13.1∗∗∗ 13.5∗∗∗
(39.5) (42.9) (37.9) (22.8) (11.0) (11.4)
Independent Party 0.94 0.63∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.12) (0.11) (0.074) (0.075)
Median Party (l-r) 2.16∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗
(0.29) (0.13)
Median Party (nat) 1.45∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗
(0.18) (0.25)
Wtd Dist. to Median (l-r) 0.35∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.077)
Wtd Dist. to Median (nat) 0.72∗∗∗ 1.00
(0.067) (0.12)
Ideol. Range (l-r) 0.53∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.037)
Ideol. Range (nat) 0.83∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.042)
Party-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Government-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 19,391 19,391 19,391 19,391 19,391 19,391
Log Likelihood -1,190.0 -1,189.9 -1,170.5 -1,133.3 -1,102.5 -1,085.9
No. Form. Opp. 489 489 489 489 489 489
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The results of these robustness tests show that, before controlling for ideology, governments
which include independent parties seem to be neither more nor less likely to form. Once the
ideological controls are included, however, independent parties appear to be less, not more,
prone to becoming a member of the invested government.16 With respect to ideology –and
under the strict assumptions described above– the results again square with previous findings:
being in the median of both dimensions tends to make participation in government more likely;
15Alternative measurement decisions such as considering these parties to be placed in the average position
of the rest of parties in the formation opportunity in both dimensions leave results fundamentally unaltered.
For parties with an explicit link to regional or nation-wide parties, on the other hand, the positions are drawn
from survey data on perceived party positions from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research (Centro de
Investigaciones Sociológicas). See Table C.1 in the Appendix for further details.
16Moreover, in an interactive model adding the multiplicative term GCI * Independent Party, the interaction
is not statistically significant, indicating that the effect of the GCI is no different for independent an non-
independent parties.
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while ideological distance, as measured in Glasgow and Golder (2015), and the ideological range
between the most extreme positions within the potential government, substantially decrease
the odds of formation. But most importantly, the effect of geographical concentration remains
positive and strong across the board. It is true that the magnitude of the GCI effect decreases,
in particular when both ideological distance and range are controlled for, but it is always
strongly statistically significant (p< .01).
In addition, I check for the robustness of the above findings through the consideration of
alternative measures of parties’ geographical concentration. Table 7 presents the results of the
baseline model but with different specifications of the key independent variable. All measures
are standardized to facilitate interpretation of the coefficient estimates in terms of the impact
of one additional standard deviation. Column 1 basically offers the results of the baseline
model (see column 3 in Table 4) but with the standardized GCI. In column 2 the GCI of
the potential government is averaged across the number of participants in the government,
whereas in column 3 the GCI is weighted by the seat share contribution of each party to
the coalition. Columns 4 and 5 use Bochsler’s (2010) ‘weighted Party Nationalization Score’
(wPNS), subtracted from 1; which is essentially the same measure as the GCI, but without
correcting for the unequal number of census tracts across municipalities. Finally, I also use the
Gini index itself in columns 6-7.17 The impact of geographical concentration seems to stand
up to scrutiny under the specific measure being used, with coefficients of a larger or smaller
magnitude depending on the particular specification, but in any case reaching conventional
levels of statistical significance.
Lastly, as a final robustness check, I take parties rather than potential governments as the
objects of observation and offer estimates of various binary logit regressions in Table 8. Columns
1 and 2 show the impact of GCI at the party level, specifying clustered standard errors and
including formation opportunity fixed effects, respectively. Columns 3-5 dichotomize the GCI
to build an indicator variable taking value ‘1’ if that party has a GCI score above 0.127 (the
90th percentile of the distribution) and ‘0’ otherwise. In addition, in order to improve balance,
the coefficient for the dichotomous GCI in column 4 is estimated through the implementation of
coarsened exact matching (Iacus et al., 2008) using Sturge’s binning algorithm, while the model
17Starting in model 3, the columns in odd numbers present the estimates of the different measures weighted
by the seat share contribution of each party to the government.
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Table 7. Coalition Formation & Geographical Concentration
Robustness to Alternative Measures
clogit clogit clogit clogit clogit clogit clogit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GCI (std) 1.97∗∗∗
(0.29)
GCI (av.) (std) 1.34∗∗∗
(0.14)
GCI (wtd contrib.) (std) 1.48∗∗∗
(0.18)
Rev. wPNS (std) 1.58∗∗∗
(0.24)




Gini (wtd contrib.) (std) 1.35∗∗
(0.19)
Party-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Government-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 19,391 19,391 19,391 19,406 19,406 19,391 19,391
Log Likelihood -1190.0 -1197.7 -1197.4 -1199.1 -1201.1 -1197.4 -1199.5
No. Form. Opp. 489 489 489 490 490 489 489
Note: Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses. Party-level controls include Incumbent Party,
Largest Party, Incumbent Mayor Seat Share, and Seat Share2/100. Government-level controls include Incumbent
Government, Minority Government, Minimum Winning Coalition, and N. of Parties. For the complete list of
coefficient estimates and standard errors see Table B.3 in the appendix.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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in column 5 uses the same procedure but forces strata to have the same number of treated and
control units. All results are reassuring in that a strong empirical relationship exists between
the geographical concentration of a party’s support base and its odds of being a member of the
next government.
Table 8. Coalition Formation & Geographical Concentration




Dichot. IV CE match.
CE match.
(k2k)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Geo. Concentration (GCI) 18.5∗∗∗ 13.5∗∗∗
(12.0) (13.6)
High GCI (>p90) 1.37∗∗ 1.35∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.19) (0.31)
Party-level Controls YES YES YES YES YES
N 2445 2418 2449 2177 480
Log Likelihood -1457.4 -842.5 -1466.0 -1216.6 -296.3
No. Form. Opp. 489 482 490 490 293
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses. Party-level controls include Incumbent Party, Largest
Party, Incumbent Mayor Seat Share, and Seat Share2/100. For the complete list of coefficient estimates and
standard errors see Table B.4 in the appendix.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
6 Conclusions
The different ways in which votes can be distributed across the territory shape many aspects of
political systems. Parties whose votes are regionalized in a particular area respond to electoral
incentives that are very different from those faced by parties with a more homogeneous geo-
graphical distribution of votes. This is then expressed in their own policy agenda, which they
try to pursue with greater or lesser success. And while evidence has accrued to suggest that the
demands of regionalized parties are sometimes more likely to be translated into actual policy
than others, we know little about their participation in the governments that are ultimately in
charge of making these policies.
This paper has argued that geographically concentrated parties seek policy objectives that
are often orthogonal to the ones other parties pursue, and that this feature opens the door
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to policy compromises that would be unavailable if all parties were homogeneously distributed
across the territory. Because they are primarily focused on the region(s) where they obtain
the lion’s share of their votes, rather than on the whole territory, they will tend to prioritize
locally-targeted policies (mostly pork-barrel spending) over the universalistic policies defended
by more programmatic parties. The presence of this type of parties in a party system, therefore,
greases the mechanism whereby interparty agreements are built: it affords opportunities for
mutually advantageous logrolling both with parties that pursue other types of (programmatic)
objectives and with parties whose interests are similarly locally focused, but in different areas of
the territory. In parliamentary systems, that should be expressed in the demands that parties
bring to the table when it is time to negotiate over the formation of a new government, in the
following terms: the geographical concentration of a party’s votes is expected to increase its
compatibility with other parties thereby making its participation in government more likely.
This expectation has been tested on a sample of around 500 formation opportunities and
20,000 potential governments in 131 municipalities from Catalonia, Spain. These provide an
appropriate test bed for this general theory as their local executives have multi-purpose com-
petences and elections commonly result in minority configurations. Using a measure based on
the Gini coefficient, the paper has documented a robust and remarkably sizable positive impact
of geographic concentration on the likelihood of government participation, which is actually
greater than that of other, more traditionally observed variables in the study of government
formation processes. Furthermore, this effect is found to be even stronger when the territorial
concentration of the party is located in the periphery of the territory rather than in the center.
This result has important implications for scholarly research on government formation, party
politics, and political geography. The territorial distribution of votes at the party level seems to
be an equally, if not more, important determinant of ‘who gets in’ as compared to other, more
traditional, factors and, therefore, should be taken into account in future studies on the topic.
Similarly, these results may provide clues to understanding the success of regional parties under
very different institutional contexts: it is through demands that are more amenable to logroll
bartering that these parties are able to succeed in shaping national governments’ policies. Also,
this paper has demonstrated that research on political geography should consider the impact
that geography exerts on phenomena that operate in between citizens’ electorally-expressed
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preferences and policy outcomes, such as the selection of political executives.
At a more general level, the findings are also highly relevant for the functioning of democratic
systems. By examining the process by which governments are formed, this paper has provided
evidence to suggest that the political interests of territorially concentrated societal groups
are more likely to be reflected in executive policies than the programmatic demands of those
whose political affiliations are more evenly distributed across the geography of the system,
even in proportional electoral systems. Future research should confirm whether or not this is
actually the case, as implied by the theoretical argument put forward in this paper. Likewise,
forthcoming works may explore potential heterogeneous effects of geographical concentration:
its impact could be conditional on contextual characteristics of the polity and/or time period,
that fall beyond the scope of what this paper has intended to show. Finally, the territorial
distribution of the votes of a party is clearly endogenous to both observable and, perhaps
more importantly, unobservable characteristics of the party. To the extent that it is also
relevant to explaining participation in government, the causal nature of the relationship between
geographical concentration and government formation needs to be approached with caution.
Exogenous sources of variation in the territorial distribution of parties’ votes should be studied
before a stronger causal inference can be drawn.
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A Variance of GCIs
The main text posed a conjecture about whether it may not be only the overall geographical
concentration of a coalition that mattered for the likelihood of formation, but also the dis-
parity between parties. Table A.1 provides the estimates of two additive and two interactive
conditional logit models (based on model 3 in Table 4), that include the standard deviation of
parties’ Geographical Concentration Index (SD of GCI) as a covariate, and its interaction with
the overall GCI. The difference between the columns 1 and 2 on the one hand, and columns 3
and 4 on the other, is that for the former, those potential governments composed of one party
only are assigned a zero standard deviation of geographical concentration, while for the latter,
the measure is set to a missing value. The discrepancy in the number of observations is in
line with this decision. All in all, neither the main effects nor the interactions yield any statis-
tically or substantially significant effect, suggesting that the variance of parties’ geographical
concentration does not affect government formation once we control for the coalition’s GCI
itself.
Table A.1. Coalition Formation & Geographical Concentration
Including Variance of GCIs
clogit clogit clogit clogit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incumbent Party 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Largest Party 2.77∗∗∗ 2.77∗∗∗ 2.38∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗∗
(0.54) (0.54) (0.50) (0.50)
Incumbent Mayor 0.53∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.096) (0.10) (0.10)
Seat Share 1.29∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.053) (0.053)
Seat Share2/100 0.81∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028)
Incumbent Government 5.27∗∗∗ 5.25∗∗∗ 7.47∗∗∗ 7.50∗∗∗
(0.79) (0.78) (1.51) (1.52)
Minority Government 0.41∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.097) (0.097)
Minimum Winning Coalition 1.56∗∗ 1.57∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.29) (0.41) (0.41)
N. of Parties 0.25∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.043) (0.072) (0.074)
GCI 108.6∗∗∗ 75.8∗∗∗ 17.0∗∗ 25.3∗∗
(113.2) (100.0) (19.3) (36.8)
SD of GCI 0.058 0.019 1.29 5.48
(0.13) (0.064) (3.35) (23.1)
GCI * SD of GCI 17.4 0.042
(111.7) (0.31)
N 19,391 19,391 13,947 13,947
Log Likelihood -1189.2 -1189.1 -887.8 -887.7
No. Form. Opp. 489 489 382 382
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
B Complete Regression Tables
B.1 The Impact of Peripherality
This appendix offers the estimates of the full specifications of the models summarized in Table 5,
including the covariates not shown in the main text.
Table B.1. Coalition Formation & Geographical Concentration
Impact of Peripherality (2003-2011)
clogit clogit
(1) (2)
Incumbent Party 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12)
Largest Party 2.31∗∗∗ 2.26∗∗∗
(0.56) (0.55)
Incumbent Mayor 0.50∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
Seat Share 1.38∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.065)
Seat Share2/100 0.75∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030)
Incumbent Government 4.42∗∗∗ 4.31∗∗∗
(0.87) (0.85)
Minority Government 0.22∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.079)
Minimum Winning Coalition 1.06 1.08
(0.25) (0.26)
N. of Parties 0.36∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(0.14) (0.18)




GCI * Peripherality 2.71∗∗
(1.12)
N 14145 14145
Log Likelihood -737.8 -735.3
No. Form. Opp. 295 295
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
B.2 Addition of Ideological Covariates
This appendix offers the estimates of the full specifications of the models summarized in Table 6,
including the covariates not shown in the main text.
Table B.2. Coalition Formation & Geographical Concentration
Robustness to Ideological Distance and Type of Party
clogit clogit clogit clogit clogit clogit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incumbent Party 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Largest Party 2.74∗∗∗ 2.74∗∗∗ 2.29∗∗∗ 1.82∗∗∗ 2.78∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.53) (0.46) (0.39) (0.55) (0.46)
Incumbent Mayor 0.52∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.096) (0.091) (0.082) (0.088) (0.082)
Seat Share 1.29∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Seat Share2/100 0.81∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Incumbent Government 5.31∗∗∗ 5.31∗∗∗ 5.01∗∗∗ 4.41∗∗∗ 3.84∗∗∗ 3.62∗∗∗
(0.79) (0.79) (0.74) (0.66) (0.58) (0.55)
Minority Government 0.42∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.57∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.17) (0.12) (0.15)
Minimum Winning Coalition 1.53∗∗ 1.53∗∗ 1.61∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36)
N. of Parties 0.26∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 1.30 1.15
(0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.068) (0.24) (0.22)
Geo. Concentration (GCI) 47.6∗∗∗ 50.7∗∗∗ 44.5∗∗∗ 27.0∗∗∗ 13.1∗∗∗ 13.5∗∗∗
(39.5) (42.9) (37.9) (22.8) (11.0) (11.4)
Independent Party 0.94 0.63∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.12) (0.11) (0.074) (0.075)
Median Party (l-r) 2.16∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗
(0.29) (0.13)
Median Party (nat) 1.45∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗
(0.18) (0.25)
Wtd Dist. to Median (l-r) 0.35∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.077)
Wtd Dist. to Median (nat) 0.72∗∗∗ 1.00
(0.067) (0.12)
Ideol. Range (l-r) 0.53∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.037)
Ideol. Range (nat) 0.83∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.042)
N 19391 19391 19391 19391 19391 19391
Log Likelihood -1190.0 -1189.9 -1170.5 -1133.3 -1102.5 -1085.9
No. Form. Opp. 489 489 489 489 489 489
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
B.3 Alternative Measures of Geographical Concentration
This appendix offers the estimates of the full specifications of the models summarized in Ta-
ble 7, including the covariates not shown in the main text. The formulae of the geographical
concentration indices are also displayed (see main text for the definition of each of them and
for the notation used). Recall that in this robustness test the indices are later standardized


































































































































































Table B.3. Coalition Formation & Geographical Concentration
Robustness to Alternative Measures
clogit clogit clogit clogit clogit clogit clogit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Incumbent Party 0.56∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Largest Party 2.74∗∗∗ 2.75∗∗∗ 2.93∗∗∗ 2.75∗∗∗ 2.95∗∗∗ 2.73∗∗∗ 2.93∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.53) (0.58) (0.53) (0.58) (0.53) (0.58)
Incumbent Mayor 0.52∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.095) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.096)
Seat Share 1.29∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Seat Share2/100 0.81∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Incumbent Government 5.31∗∗∗ 5.38∗∗∗ 5.35∗∗∗ 5.36∗∗∗ 5.37∗∗∗ 5.37∗∗∗ 5.37∗∗∗
(0.79) (0.80) (0.80) (0.80) (0.80) (0.80) (0.80)
Minority Government 0.42∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Minimum Winning Coalition 1.53∗∗ 1.52∗∗ 1.52∗∗ 1.56∗∗ 1.54∗∗ 1.54∗∗ 1.52∗∗
(0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28)
N. of Parties 0.26∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
GCI (std) 1.97∗∗∗
(0.29)
GCI (av.) (std) 1.34∗∗∗
(0.14)
GCI (wtd contrib.) (std) 1.48∗∗∗
(0.18)
Rev. wPNS (std) 1.58∗∗∗
(0.24)




Gini (wtd contrib.) (std) 1.35∗∗
(0.19)
N 19,391 19,391 19,391 19,406 19,406 19,391 19,391
Log Likelihood -1190.0 -1197.7 -1197.4 -1199.1 -1201.1 -1197.4 -1199.5
No. Form. Opp. 489 489 489 490 490 489 489
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
B.4 Binary Logit Models
This appendix offers the estimates of the full specifications of the models summarized in Table 8,
including the covariates not shown in the main text.
Table B.4. Coalition Formation & Geographical Concentration
Robustness to Binary Logits
clust s.e. form. opp. FE Dichot. IV CE match. CE match. (k2k)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Incumbent Party 2.23∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗
(0.31) (0.27) (0.30) (0.30) (0.39)
Largest Party 6.40∗∗∗ 5.25∗∗∗ 6.27∗∗∗ 6.66∗∗∗ 6.27∗∗∗
(1.33) (1.11) (1.30) (1.85) (3.87)
Incumbent Mayor 0.26∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) (0.061)
Seat Share 1.00 0.97∗ 1.00 1.05∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.036)
Seat Share2/100 1.05 1.11∗∗ 1.05 0.95 0.91
(0.031) (0.045) (0.031) (0.034) (0.071)
Geo. Concentration (GCI) 18.5∗∗∗ 13.5∗∗∗
(12.0) (13.6)
High GCI (>p90) 1.37∗∗ 1.35∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.19) (0.31)
N 2445 2418 2449 2177 480
Log Likelihood -1457.4 -842.5 -1466.0 -1216.6 -296.3
No. Form. Opp. 489 482 490 490 293
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
C Party Positions
The first robustness check provided in the paper attempts to control for the role of ideology in
government formation. As mentioned, the main obstacle lies in the absence of reliable data on
the positioning, within the conventional ideological spectrum, of Catalan parties at the local
level. Two strong assumptions are then required. Firstly, all independent parties, namely those
without an explicit organizational connection to a specific nation- or region-wide party, are
placed in the middle of both the left-right and Spanish-Catalan nationalism dimensions (5 in
a scale ranging from 0 to 10). Secondly, for the rest of the parties it is assumed that they
all share the exact same position as the nation- or region-wide party they are linked with.
Table C.1 shows the positions used in the analyses for each party, which are averages of parties’
positions (as perceived by citizens over rather long data series) drawn from the Spanish Centre
for Sociological Research.
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